Confucian Leadership Democracy: A Roadmap by JIN, Yutang
Comparative Philosophy 12.2 (2021)  JIN 
 
Comparative Philosophy Volume 12, No. 2 (2021): 79-102 










ABSTRACT: What kind of polity is justified by classic Confucian values? Adopting an 
interpretive approach, this paper explores the idea of leadership democracy being expressive 
of classic Confucian values by first introducing the models of leadership democracy associated 
with Weber and Schumpeter and second connecting Confucian elitist values to them. I argue 
that leadership democracy best realizes the Confucian emphasis on the people as the source of 
legitimacy and the ruler as the engine of good governance. The Confucian idea of people-
rootedness is borne out by citizens behaving as democratic plebeians who are empowered to 
choose their leader but devoid of moral and intellectual capabilities for collective decision-
making. The Confucian idea of rulership is expressed by democratic leaders displaying 
competent statesmanship and compensating for intra-elite tensions within the Confucian 
tradition. 
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Debates on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy have gone a long 
way from examining their compatibility to exploring various ways in which Confucian 
democracy can be justified and the particular shape it takes following its justification 
(Ames and Hall 1999; Angle 2012; Chan 2013; Kim 2018; Tan 2003). For many 
theorists today, Confucian democracy is no longer an oxymoron that defies the 
possibility of a happy union between two markedly different traditions (Huntington 
1993; Levenson 1966). Instead, democracy gradually comes to assume a central place 
in scholastic discussion as “the only game in town”. This trend, however, is widely 
contested by a constellation of scholars broadly identified as Confucian meritocrats. 
Their preoccupation is largely with reviving and making sense of meritocratic strands 
in Confucianism in ways that meet the challenges posed by the hegemony of liberal 
democracy (Bai 2008; Bai 2019; Bell 2009; Bell 2016; Jiang 2013; Kang 2005). 
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   For many, normative proposals start with the philosophical reconstruction of 
Confucianism. Often availing themselves of multiple sources from different 
philosophical traditions (mostly Confucian and Western, both broadly construed), they 
participate in “a reflective project in cross-tradition engagement that has its focus on 
most-relevant aspects of the target texts from different traditions to a jointly concerned 
issue under examination” (Mou 2020, 140) where the jointly concerned issue is 
normative theories of democracy and meritocracy. In philosophical reconstruction, the 
“other” elements from different traditions that are “external” to each other have now 
become “internal” contributing parts that are necessary to reconstructed Confucian 
theories. Without delegitimizing the value of their intellectual pursuit, this article 
embarks on a related but different inquiry querying the scope of interpretation, which 
is a crucial issue largely glossed over by contemporary Confucians. An interpretive 
question typically asks what kind of Confucian polity is conceptually possible within 
the pedigree of Confucian thought—that is, whether Confucian thought justifies 
meritocracy or democracy and what kind of meritocracy or democracy follows such a 
justification. Philosophical interpretation and reconstruction are not exclusive of one 
another—they are simply different matrixes according to which an account can be 
evaluated independent of the author’s intention.1 
  Interpretation here is not the same as seeking to “approximate the perspectives of 
past thinkers whose ideas are recorded in past texts”; rather, it closely resembles the 
“preliminary-engagement” phase of what Bo Mou (2020, 142) calls the “synchronic-
multiple-dimension model” in cross-tradition engagement. In other words, my work 
seeks to understand and articulate Confucian standpoints in relation to the substantial 
issue of democracy, which does not refrain from deploying concepts and resources 
external to traditional Confucianism to capture and articulate various meanings of the 
Confucian text. But my approach nevertheless differs from Mou’s model in two aspects: 
first, the interpretation I propose pursues not so much a comprehensive goal of cross-
tradition engagement but an understanding of the Confucian outlook as an end-in-itself. 
Second, the disciplinary pedigree both enacted and constrained by a particular tradition 
(in my case, Confucianism) is as important as the substantial issue under examination 
(the idea of democracy). In this sense, my interpretation pertains to the method of what 
Stephen Angle (2012, 9) calls “rooted global philosophy”. 
  Why should we attend to the issue of interpretation in addition to philosophical 
reconstruction and normative configuration? Briefly, the scope of interpretation merits 
particular attention for two reasons. First, the way Confucian sources are invoked is an 
inquiry valuable for its own sake. It is worth asking, in line with the Confucian tradition, 
what the spirit of Confucianism is (Chan 2013, 5-17) and how the Way it displays (dao-
tong 道統 ) (Makeham 2003) impacts on contemporary politics. For instance, in 
addition to asking what form of citizenship is normatively plausible and how different 
 
1 For instance, the fact that some Confucian democrats intend to reconstruct Confucian philosophy by 
blending it with Western democratic values in pursuit of some synthesis does not preclude them from 
being evaluated from an interpretive perspective. Alternatively, a work solely focusing on interpretation 
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sources, Confucian or not, can be amalgamated to support democratic citizenship, we 
may also ask what kind of citizenship the stretch of Confucian sources can support. 
Second, interpretation is an enduring tradition within which generations of Confucians 
have gone about their intellectual inquiry. Late Qing Confucians, Japanese Confucians 
in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras as well as twentieth century New Confucians 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan have all been concerned with, not only to what extentmodern 
values are plausible in their own right, but whether and how Confucian values support 
political modernity especially democracy (Paramore, 2016; Tseng, 2020). 2  Does 
embracing modern values mean that we should dispense with the Confucian tradition? 
If not, how is it possible for one to forsake part of the tradition and still faithfully claim 
one’s modern account as Confucian? Shunning the practice of interpretation, therefore, 
risks dismissing massive intellectual exercises that attempt to grasp the complex 
relationship between Confucianism and democracy.  
   That said, there are broadly three ways in which one can register a stance on the 
issue of interpretation. First, an interpreter can claim that her interpretation (whether 
meritocratic, democratic or hybrid) is the only faithful reading of the Confucian 
tradition. Second, a weaker claim is that one’s interpretation is the best or the most 
faithful reading of Confucianism though there are many legitimate ways in which it can 
be read and interpreted. Finally, an even weaker position than the second one is that 
one’s interpretation is one among many possible interpretations of Confucianism, each 
of them palatable in different contexts. The last stance verges on seeking compatibility 
between Confucianism and democracy by reinterpreting some Confucian texts and is 
most accommodative in terms of its interpretive strategy.  
  In light of the three stances above, the core argument I make in this article—that 
core ideas of classic Confucianism, which I recast as plebeian and elitist values, are 
delivered in what I call “Confucian leadership democracy” (henceforth CLD)—can be 
read in two ways depending on the context in which one situates my work. First, this 
article can be seen as pertaining to the second claim and proposing the most promising 
reading of Confucian texts within the legitimate boundary of interpretation. Some 
recent studies (Jin 2020), by focusing on Confucian meritocracy and participatory 
Confucian democracy, show that both of them overuse one aspect (either elitist or 
plebeian) of Confucian democracy while leaving other elements in limbo. Jin briefly 
sketched a realist Confucian democracy that combines democratic election with strong 
leadership, of which CLD is one variant, as the most plausible approach to 
understanding Confucian ethico-political demands. In this context, this work builds on, 
and extends, this account. Alternatively, one may understand my current piece as fitting 
into the third, “compatibility” category as it is also a standalone work that explores the 
overlapping area between Confucianism and democracy without assuming the 
 
2 It should nevertheless be noted that not all commentators agree that New Confucians worked within 
the interpretive canon. Angle and David Elstein 2012 tend to understand Mou Zongsan as offering 
Confucian reasoning for democracy (thus falling within the interpretive category), while Thomas 
Fröhlich 2017 views Tang Junyi, a contemporary of Mou, as advocating for civil-theological modern 
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interpretive superiority of CLD over previous views. Seen in this light, my work 
proposes an original way of rendering Confucianism and democracy compatible 
without attempting to demolish its contenders.  
  With a conceptual setup in hand, we can proceed with our discussion. In the rest of 
the article, I first argue, by invoking Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, that 
leadership democracy is not a way of life offering tantalizing promises of participatory 
rights and collective decision-making but a cluster of institutions that hold the elite 
leader to account by providing them with incentives to compete for popular vote. 
Second, I discuss the sense in which Confucian plebeian values are borne out by 
citizens behaving as democratic citizens empowered to choose their leader but devoid 
of moral and intellectual virtues for collective decision-making. Finally, as a parallel 
case, I recast Confucian rulers as democratic leaders in leadership democracy by 
exploring their resemblances and how democratic leadership can deliver on Confucian 
elitist values. 
 
2. LEADERSHIP DEMOCRACY: WEBER AND SCHUMPETER 
 
Before we examine the close relationship between Confucian values and leadership 
democracy, it is worth briefly clarifying what the latter denotes. The leadership or 
competitive model of democracy 3  as we know it today is often associated with 
Schumpeter. Its nascent form, however, can be traced back to Weber whose influence 
on Schumpeter was enormous (Osterhammel 1987). Weber’s and Schumpeter’s views 
on democracy are, first and foremost, responses to their respective social and political 
contexts (Eliaeson 1998; Medearis 1997, 820). For Weber (1978, 975), leadership 
democracy is largely a recipe for addressing problems associated with the hegemony 
of modern social and political forces, especially that of state bureaucratization in the 
age of modernity as an iron-cage. Schumpeter’s concern, as noted above, is over “the 
classic doctrine of democracy”, which is an uneasy blender of post-Enlightenment, 
utilitarian and Rousseauian elements (Held 2006, 149-150; Plamenatz 1973, 96-99). 
Despite their different concerns, the forms of democracy that they delineate are 
strikingly similar and I will focus on what they share in common as a starting point. 
Weber’s “plebiscitarian leadership democracy” is a political mechanism by which the 
people exercise control over politicians and competent leaders are selected (Weber, 
1994, 339). The Schumpeterian model of democracy also puts at the center a dynamic 
interaction between leaders and the electorate, which refers to “that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 2010, 
269). 
  The primary feature of leadership democracy is the lopsided relationship between 
the powerful political elite and democratic citizens deficient in capacities needed for 
coping with complex governance issues. Democracy for Weber (1978, 985) is not the 
 
3 Weberian and Schumpeterian types of leadership democracy are by no means identical. My emphasis 
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“greatest possible rule of the demos but the party leaders of the demos” because the 
“shapeless mass” never govern themselves or large associations. Weber (1994, 326) 
likens the political structure of representative democracy to a firm controlled by 
shareholders’ meeting in which it is not shareholders, but “the board of trustees” that 
wields real influence and makes important decisions on whom to recruit for 
management. It is therefore natural that the leader of the Caesarist type grows out of 
democracy whose efficiency “depends on the position of the Caesar as a free trustee of 
the masses who is unfettered by tradition” (Weber 1978, 961).  Schumpeter goes further 
than Weber in attacking a particular way of understanding democracy as a political 
exercise by which the popular will directly translates into policy and law (Miller 1983). 
Schumpeter (2010, 254) argues that there is no such thing as the “popular will,” and 
even if we take the majority preference as the popular will, it may turn out that “non-
democratic agencies may be more acceptable to the people than democratic bodies”.4 
A democratic leader is interested not so much in popular demand directly as in 
amassing popular vote for election success the same way suppliers in the market are 
mainly driven by economic benefits, not by satisfying consumer desires directly (Miller 
1983, 134). 
  For both Weber and Schumpeter, political leaders are, as they should be, trained in 
political struggles for power. The training and formation of responsible political 
leadership requires as necessary conditions partisanship and parliament—especially a 
parliament that does not practice “negative politics” but is endowed with real functional 
power. For Weber (1994, 339, 351) “the creation of party machines…means the advent 
of plebiscitarian democracy”, and “the only choice lies between a leadership 
democracy with a ‘machine’ and democracy without a leader, which means rule by the 
professional politician who has no vocation, the type of man who lacks precisely those 
inner, charismatic qualities which make a leader”. By the same token, “The purpose of 
parliamentarization” is “to turn parliament into a place where leaders can be selected 
or train politicians who can assume leadership posts” (Weber 1994, 251). Schumpeter 
(2010, 246) explicitly suggests replacing the notion of “government by the people” 
with that of “government approved by the people”. What results is a reversal of the 
sequence by which “the deciding of issues by the electorate” is made “secondary to the 
election of the men who are to do the deciding” (Schumpeter 2010, 269; emphasis 
added). The particular merit of Schumpeter’s model is his emphasis on elite 
competition for votes, which differs from the notion of representation which carries its 
own paradoxes (Pitkin 1967). As Ian Shapiro (2009, 58) accurately points out, the 
drastic move made by Schumpeter is from the language of representation to that of 
consumer sovereignty. Here Schumpeter goes further than Weber in focusing on the 
competitive nature of leadership democracy, which not only offers an accurate 
depiction of the way democracy works in reality, but also brings forward the vital role 
 
4 One of distinctive contributions of Schumpeter lies in his rejection of the classic doctrine of the popular 
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of political leadership, which he takes to be neglected by many democratic theorists of 
his day.  
  For both Weber and Schumpeter, a plausible account of democracy does not give 
effect to the idea of self-legislation by which the people exercise collective self-rule. 
From Weber and Schumpeter, we can then retrieve a realist version of democracy in 
which the political elite are motivated to seek “public acclamation” through 
competitive election. Leadership democracy gives more weight to the democratically 
elected leader than it does to the electorate in shaping the political agenda. Despite 
challenges on many fronts, this basic model still offers a sense of “historical 
felicity”(Dunn 2014, 2) and empirically delivers on democratic promises around the 
globe (Przeworski 2010). One caveat here is that CLD does not need to accept all 
features and premises of leadership democracy as associated with Weber and 
Schumpeter; rather, its basic structures of election and leadership serve as a point of 
reference for my interpretation of Confucian values.  
   How does this leadership model of democracy then relate to Confucian values? 
Given that the issue at stake revolves around the nexus between elite and people and 
CLD depends for its intelligibility on how this nexus is conceived, I shall discuss 
Confucian notions of the people and leaders and how they relate to the leadership model. 
My primary purpose in the following discussion is to demonstrate the way in which the 
telos of classic Confucian thought requires the leadership model of democracy. 
 
3. THE PEOPLE AS DEMOCRATIC PLEBEIANS 
  
In classic Confucian texts,5 the most frequent terms of reference for the people are min 
(民), zhong (眾), and bai-xing (百姓), among others. Pinning down the normative 
weight of the people in overarching Confucian ethical-political order, however, is a 
complex matter. Often the image of the people and the role they play change 
dramatically depending on the particular textual context and the prefix associated with 
the people that implies moral judgement. Let me start with one of the most tantalizing 
accounts of the people’s political role as legitimizing power transfer. In 5A5 and 5A6 
of the Mencius, Mencius takes on Wanzhang, one of his disciples, in relation to issues 
involved in power transfer. Wanzhang asks whether it is true that Sage-King Yao gave 
power to another Sage-King Shun. Mencius replies that “the King cannot give the 
empire to another” but can only “recommend” his successor to Heaven and seek a 
Heavenly Mandate. Mencius continues, “Yao put Shun in charge of ritual sacrifices, 
and the various spirits were pleased with him. This was Heaven accepting him. He put 
Shun in charge of affairs, and the affairs were well-ordered, and the people were at 
ease with him. This was the people accepting him” (Mencius 5A5, 5A6; emphasis 
added). A similar justificatory pattern is offered following Shun’s abdication to Yu and 
the succession of Yu by his son Qi. 
 
5  By classic Confucianism, I primarily refer to the Analects, the Mencius, and the Xun-Zi, which 
constitute the very core of the Confucian intellectual tradition. I will also touch on other texts including 
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   The message conveyed by Mencius is that power transfer is legitimated by the 
people being at ease or content (an 安) with the ruler in charge, in addition to the 
requirement that no natural anomalies happen. These passages are joined by others that 
justify rightful rebellions in terms of protecting the wellbeing of the people (Mencius 
1B8, 7B4). For Mencius, “the people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods 
of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler” (Mencius 7B14). For some theorists, 
these anecdotes display democratic tendencies in Mencius given that the people are so 
conceived as having an impact on the choice of the ruler (Cheng 1979; Tu 2002). 
Commentators, however, disagree over whether the people, so conceptualized, are 
active political agents sanctioning a mandate to govern or passive signs of political 
legitimacy and whether they act on opting for the ruler themselves or should be guided 
by distinguished feudal lords at the time of power transfer (Angle 2012, 37-41; El 
Amine 2015, 37-51; Kim 2011; Nuyen 2013; Tiwald 2008). 
  The interpretive question can be put as follows: do Mencian ideas require 
monarchical rule or actually support democracy and only reluctantly accommodate the 
monarchy? If it is the latter, then the claim made by many New Confucians including 
Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan that Confucianism requires democracy makes much 
more sense than is usually assumed. Answering the interpretive question, however, is 
not easy. As Chan (2013, 15) puts it, “it is unclear whether the Confucian idea of having 
one Sage King to exercise supreme authority is necessarily a part of this ideal or merely 
a product of adaptation to nonideal conditions.” Nevertheless, let’s set about addressing 
this interpretive issue.  
   One of the obstacles that blocks a democratic reading is the lack of agency on the 
people’s part in initiating and sustaining the legitimation process in the Mencius, which 
can be further perceived from two aspects. First, whether it is peaceful royal 
transmission between sage-kings or a tumultuous rebellion against the corrupt king, 
there seems to be always a discrepancy between those who lead in acting on the process 
(tian-li 天吏) and those with respect to whom the process is justified (the people) 
(Tiwald 2008, 274-277; Kim 2011, 382; El Amine 2015, ch. 1). Second, the intensity 
in terms of which the people are invoked varies depending on the mode of succession. 
The people’s expression of contentment is required for non-hereditary succession while 
heredity is justified so long as no popular revolt is discerned, which leads some to argue 
that Mencius actually displays complicity in heredity (El Amine 2015, 40). If we 
appropriate Sheldon Wolin’s distinction between politics and the political, we may 
claim that the upgrading of the people’s role in Confucian power transfer features an 
episodic, political “moment of commonality” while their agency is minimized in 
everyday politics (Wolin 1994).  
   Why does Mencius accord supreme importance to the people while granting them 
no active agency? I suggest a line of reading according to which it is not so much the 
case that Mencius is naturally predisposed to confine the rights of rebellion and royal 
endorsement to the elite few but that he encountered the problem of making sense of 
the people’s voice when its contour is amorphous. For Mencius, feudal lords and agents 
of Heaven are put in place, not for their own glory, but to give shape to the collective 
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political order. In other words, it is the concern over setting clear and undisputable 
criteria for judging when and where there emerges a popular expression of contentment 
(or lack thereof), that makes Mencius end up embracing an arrangement in which the 
agents of Heaven interpret the people’s action.  
   The reason for this plebiscitary reading lies in the particular way in which Mencius 
presents his case for popular expression. To illustrate, two contrasts between Mencius’s 
account of what I incline to call “popular approval”, and the idea of popular sovereignty 
as we find in the West, which is not necessarily tethered to democratic mechanisms, 
may help. First, because of the need to justify the supreme authority of the modern state, 
the modern idea of popular sovereignty, whether in Hobbes or Rousseau, presupposes 
a “supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority”, (Morris 2000, 7) a kind of 
uniformity that requires a holistic notion of the people, which invites the problem of 
making sense of the people’s voice. In contrast, Mencius’ language of supremacy is 
mediated by the Heavenly Mandate, and the expression of contentment from the masses 
does not carry such compelling gravity toward holism as is required in the idea of 
popular sovereignty. For Mencius, the people being decisive therefore does not 
necessarily imply their acting in unison, but allows for a cacophony of plebeian 
people’s concerns. 6  Second, underlying many contractarian accounts of popular 
sovereignty is also the idea of hypothetical consent, which “rested on what people 
would agree to if they were rational” (Chambers 2004, 154) while, for Mencius, it is 
not hypothetical scenarios but the people’s real feeling that is at stake. Confucian 
politics puts emphasis on the people’s actual feelings not only because they confer 
authority on rulership, which points to the people as the “conduit of the state’s 
legitimacy” (Angle 2012, 39), but also because Confucian rulership, instead of 
manipulating an artificial expression of the people, always builds their perfectionist 
governance on respect for the people’s natural life including their sentiments and 
expressions as valuable in itself (Xu 2013, 479-484). 
  Given that Mencius’s idea of popular approval distances itself from holistic and 
hypothetical orientations associated with popular sovereignty, it is therefore not too 
farfetched a claim that were there more tangible ways of giving effect to such an 
expression, Mencius would have willingly done away with his original arrangement. 
In line with existing readings (Chan 2007), my claim is not that Mencius did duck the 
feudal lords along with their liabilities such that democracy as an institutional measure 
is readily available in the Mencius. Nor is my claim simply that Mencius’s original 
view should be altered in light of normative standards of modern times. Rather, my 
stand here is that Mencius’s idea of popular approval would call for a more egalitarian 
arrangement than the original one on offer should its own potential be fully unleashed. 
Consequently, if we drop the temptation to associate Mencius with the popular will and 
instead connect the “contentment of the people” to the sense in which the elite are made 
 
6 Joseph Chan understands Mencius’s popular approval as consent, and he is correct that the popular 
sovereignty grounded in consent is not the same as democracy. He, however, shows a misreading of 
Mencius insofar as there is no indication that the people’s acceptance in Mencius should take a holistic 
or consent-like form, which is typical of understandings of popular sovereignty in early modern England. 
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responsive to the people’s feelings, that is, if we measure popular feelings by appealing 
to “formal institutions” (Chan 2007), we may find Mencius’s plebeian values better 
preserved and accentuated in democracy than in non-democratic regimes. 
   The pathway to Confucian democracy can be reinforced by forsaking the idea of 
falling back on the people as constitutive of emergency measures at the time of turmoil 
and instead rendering democracy normal and regular. A compelling Confucian case 
can be made for the mandate to rule to be constantly renewed rather than hover over 
the ruled until the ruler becomes too corrupt. In classic texts, the people’s feelings only 
matter explicitly at the extraordinary moments of political change and the weight of 
their expressed feelings is diminished during peaceful, dynastic rule. As a result, the 
hereditary king cannot be removed just by virtue of the fact that he fails to measure up 
to the expectation of the people. The very source of the move from the extraordinary 
to the ordinary can actually be reasonably extrapolated from classic Confucianism. The 
idea of respect for the people manifests itself in the entries in the Mencius prescribing 
that, when promoting the worthy, the ruler follows the voice of “all men in the capital”, 
not just that of her close attendants and counsellors; and that “there is a way to win 
their (the people’s) hearts; amass what they want for them; do not impose what they 
dislike on them” (Mencius 4A9). The message is more straightforward in the Great 
Learning (12) saying that “what the people like, (the ruler) likes; what the people hate, 
(the ruler) hates”. A corollary of respect for the people is thus a “politics of inexertion” 
(wuwei 無為) that cautions against the ruler’s trampling upon what the people want for 
themselves and improves their moral discipline on that basis (Slingerland 2007; Xu 
2016, 32-33). Delivering election-based democracy on a regular basis, therefore, can 
provide objective conditions under which a ruler is always responsive to what the 
people want—not doing so would be at the peril of forsaking his own office. Under 
such conditions, the ruler is institutionally bound to follow what the people want for 
themselves rather than free to interfere with their life at her whim. 
    While Mencius’s thought—or the Mencian spirit—is much more democratic than 
we usually think, one hurdle is still stuck in the way that questions the rationale behind 
the people’s action. So far, I have used such terms as “expressions” and “feelings” to 
refer to the forms in which the psychological status of an, or the people’s contentment, 
is given tangible shape. For some commentators, the passive, affective and perhaps 
spontaneous form of political action on the part of the people means that the people are 
only indicators of Heaven’s approval rather than active agents whose deliberation and 
judgement count in deciding on state affairs. The first is equivalent to asking of voters 
their opinions on whom they want in office while the second resembles sampling public 
opinion to justify one’s own public work. The striking implication of this view is that 
the people only passively respond to what the leader did in the past (Tiwald 2008, 279). 
This line of argument is not so much about who is entitled to initiate political action, 
which has been addressed above, but about what kind of political action is required for 
acting on democratic participation. Indeed, if we look at the larger picture of classic 
Confucianism, the Confucian masters took pains to emphasize the impotence of the 
people in terms of both intelligence and virtue and why they can only be made to follow 
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to be tamed and educated (Analects 12.19). In the Mencius, the people’s role is 
constantly likened to that of the petty person (xiao-ren 小人), the latter of which often 
points to those despicable personalities captivated by trivial and ignominious motives 
(Mencius 3A4, 6A14, 6A15). Similarly, Xun Zi ridicules “the virtue of min” as the 
habit of blindly following customs, being drawn to pecuniary benefits and treasuring 
prolongation of one’s life, which stands in contrast to that of the nobleman (jun-zi 君
子) (Xun-Zi, “Ru-Xiao”). 
   There are three aspects about Mencius’ understanding of the people’s political 
capability that further demonstrate Mencius’s natural affinity with leadership 
democracy rather than any of its alternatives. First, there is no compelling reason for 
setting the threshold of meaningful participation so high as to crowd out many non-
active forms of participation that fall within the range of democracy. The people’s 
ability to participate is, after all, only required to such a level as is possible for them as 
democratic citizens to fulfil basic roles such as casting votes. Reciprocal deliberation 
and active judgement may be prerequisites for deliberative and participatory forms of 
democracy (cf. Gutmann and Thompson 1998, 52-94), but they are not necessary for 
the leadership models of Weber and Schumpeter. A realistic expectation of mass 
behavior is the aspect on which Weberian and Schumpeterian models and Confucian 
values converge. Indeed, one of the merits of leadership democracy is that it 
acknowledges that the people as the multitudes are incapable of governing themselves. 
Leadership democracy only requires that the people be able to feel and respond to their 
own interests and put in power whoever they believe is likely to act on their interests. 
Similarly, the basic postulates about the people in classic Confucianism are also that 
the people tend to be selfish, non-virtuous and intemperate, which is why they need to 
be constantly taken care of by the ruler. Each individual of them, short of education 
and commitment to ethical cultivation, is close to the petty person devoid of moral 
standards. It is true that there is a nascent idea of moral equality (everyone can become 
a Yao or Shun—both sage-kings) and educational equality (Confucius claimed that he 
teaches everyone without any discrimination) in classic Confucianism (especially in 
Mencius). However, first, equal moral potential or equal opportunities for education 
can hardly be the same as actual equality, let alone a justification of democracy. Second, 
it is also helpful to draw on Ames and Hall’s (1987, 139-141) distinction between min 
as the collective masses often misguided by blindness and ignorance and ren as a 
human being in the context of personal self-cultivation. In the end, min, short of actual 
moral enlightenment, are able to express what they like and dislike (in terms of both 
raw desires and moral sentiments), which stays at the heart of Confucian political order 
and to which benevolent rulers should cater in order to legitimately stay in office 
(Mencius 4A9, 5A5, 7A31; Xun-Zi, “Wang-Zhi”). The task of the virtuous ruler is then 
to fulfil their basic needs and improve their moral wellbeing.7 
 
7 There is a scholarly disagreement on the degree of moral improvement in classic Confucianism. For 
Joseph Chan 2013 and Elton Chan 2019, for instance, Confucians are aimed at maximal moral 
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   Second, although there is a congruence between leadership democracy and 
Confucian understandings of the people, one may further question whether the 
epistemic limit of the people along with other psychosocial constraints applied to them 
can prevent a democracy fulfilling tasks required of it. The challenge here is that 
leadership democracy may distance itself from the Confucian understanding of the 
people insofar as it is premised on functional public opinion of which Confucianism 
falls short. For instance, Bentham famously used the metaphor of “public opinion 
tribunal” (Bentham 1989, 76) to describe the way in which the people affect the official 
decision-making of the elected representatives. Schmitt (2008, 257) also avowed that 
“democracy is designed as the rule of public opinion”, but if the electorate are myopic 
and ignorant—as classic Confucianism tends to assume—to such a level that they are 
incapable of forming an opinion of their own except for the matters directly related to 
their personal life, how can the public give effect to the mandate granted to the elite 
ruler? Public opinion, after all, differs from the “popular will” simpliciter discussed 
above in offering a rough contour of opinion constellations on matters of common 
concern. In the political science scholarship of the recent decades, however, any 
simplistic relationship of public opinion to policy matters is increasingly cast into doubt 
not least because of such factors as elite manipulation, media bias, and the fact that the 
public normally do not have opinions on matters beyond social and political saliency 
(Jacobs & Shapiro 2002; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). As John Zaller’s study shows, 
what matters for public opinion is the relative balance and overall amount of media 
attention to contending political positions. Consequently, as he puts it, citizens “do not 
have fixed opinion beforehand” but only “construct ‘opinion statements’ on the fly as 
they confront each new issue” (Zaller 1992). 
   If pessimistic views of public opinion carry some plausibility, it follows that 
functioning democracy does not necessarily presuppose informed public opinion, 
which helps to affirm that Confucian assumptions about the people’s incompetence are 
enough to justify democracy. After all, all that is required of the electorate is their 
judging of the ruler’s ability to govern and responsiveness to the electorate’s personal 
concerns by retrospective voting, which is close to what Confucian masters get to say 
about the people’s political behavior. Leadership democracy, by separating off the 
choice of the ruler from the collective choice of complex policies, gears itself up for 
the conditions under which public opinion does not come across as valid contributions 
from the public. This, in turn, sheds light on the distance between Schumpeterian 
democracy upon which CLD is built and classic doctrines modelled upon public 
opinion which provide some traces of Bentham and the two Mills, and of which 
Schumpeter is deeply skeptical. Also, under such conditions, retrospective voting can 
actually turn out to work remarkably well in the citizenry’s interest. As Manin (1997, 
179) argues, rejection of the incumbent can be more efficient than election based on 
the proposed policy as it is more certain from the electorate’s perspective that the 
existing policy does not work to their benefit than that the promises made by the 
 
however, common people are only expected to improve their moral status to such a level as is required 
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competing political elites can be fulfilled once they assume office. Retrospective voting, 
hence, can be as rational for citizens to opt for as any more in-depth deliberation and 
prediction of the public policy, if they can ever come close to measuring up to the latter 
undertaking.8 
   Finally, deep skepticism about the people’s capability also stems from their 
reflection of something different from, if not entirely external to, their body natural. 
The people, after all, speak on behalf of Heaven, who is invisible and reifies itself 
through the “people’s eyes and ears” (Mencius 5A5). According to this view, it is not 
the people themselves but Heaven that stands behind them, that is decisive, which 
undermines the idea of the people per se being decisive in popular approval associated 
with democracy. It is, however, not necessarily the case that the people speaking on 
behalf of deities contradict the idea that the people are decisive. If we venture to the 
early modern period of England when the modern idea of popular sovereignty was born 
out of the crossfire between parliamentarians and royalists, we may find that popular 
sovereignty loomed large ab initio not as the idea that the people speak for themselves, 
but out of a political context in which the people are so conjectured as communicating 
directly with, speaking on behalf of, the deity. Henry Parker, one of the earliest 
spokespersons for the modern idea of popular sovereignty, argued that God, through 
the people, chooses the hereditary kings as the ruler. The kings’ power is not absolute 
but qualified by limitations set by fundamental laws and the people’s representatives 
in Parliament. Should the limits be violated, the people through their representatives 
have the power to revoke their trust in the king (Morgan 1989, 27-28). This narrative 
looks strikingly similar to the story recounted by Mencius in which the feudal lords 
speak and act on behalf of the people to remove the corrupt ruler at the behest of Heaven. 
If the former case stands as a sufficiently intelligible variety of popular sovereignty, 
there seems no reason why the second cannot support Mencius’s popular approval. 
What matters here is not so much who, taken at face value, is in charge but how the 
spiritual languages are manipulated in the service of popular approval.  
 
4. CONFUCIAN RULERS AS DEMOCRATIC LEADERS 
 
With reference to Mencius, I argued above that the plebeian value of Confucianism 
calls for democracy while the monarchy along with its hierarchical structure is not what 
Mencian thought genuinely requires. But how about the elitist value of Confucianism?  
  For Weber, it is inevitable, under the modern conditions of the industrialized mass 
society, that the leader of the Caesarist ilk emerges from the democratic process whose 
vocation lies in combatting the corrosive effects of self-serving bureaucrats and 
delivering on political leadership that presides over incessant power struggles. In 
 
8 Is there a tension between trusting people in choosing their ruler and being skeptical about their self-
governance? I believe not. While examining rationales behind classic Confucians’ support of plebeian 
values is beyond the scope of this article, we can reasonably postulate that the Confucians believe the 
people can gauge a leader’s competence through a simple feeling of whether the leader delivers while 
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Schumpeterian democracy, the model of the elite being in charge remains largely 
unchanged, which is complemented by crucial competitive mechanisms by which the 
electorate as consumers choose from the politicians at loggerhead with each other 
competing for votes. This, of course, does not mean that political leadership cannot 
exist in more participatory democratic systems—after all, rhetoric and persuasion by 
leaders had a high profile in the Athenian ekklesia. Athenian leaders, however, were 
featured by their speaking and advisory functions and severely constrained by adult 
citizens’ direct participation and collective decision-making from bodies largely 
chosen by lot (Ober 2009, 107). What is remarkable in leadership democracy is thus a 
large scope for political maneuvers reserved for the political elite who are 
democratically elected and only accountable to the electorate on a periodic basis. How 
does leadership democracy, then, best realize Confucian understandings of leadership? 
Put differently, how is it possible that Confucian elitist values can be better delivered 
in leadership democracy than in, say, meritocracy and participatory democracy? 
   Confucian political order is often allegorically characterized as a combination of 
“inner sagehood” and “outer kinghood” that depicts the political sphere as a natural 
flow from personal self-cultivation to family, state, and worldly affairs (Great Learning 
1). At the center of this overarching ethical-political order resides the moral exemplar 
firmly committed to both self-cultivation and ramification of moral values to her 
surroundings, which constitute two sides of the same coin. It is no exaggeration to say 
that leadership along with ideal personhood associated with it is the most important 
factor in securing peace and delivering on the Confucian Way pivoted around such 
values as benevolence and righteousness. For Confucian masters, the question of who 
is in charge and the quality of order that one is able to deliver is inextricably interrelated. 
Without the virtuous ruler in charge, there is no possibility that the vision of Confucian 
politics can ever be brought into fruition. Says Confucius, “the rule of virtue can be 
compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars 
without leaving its place” (Analects 2.1) and also, “to govern is to correct. If you set an 
example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect” (12.17)? There are also 
ample anecdotes in the Mencius and the Xun-Zi directly associating the prevalence of 
the Way with the virtue of the ruler, and abysmal failures in ruling with the ruler’s 
moral debilitation (Mencius 1A5, 1A7, 1B8, 2A5, 7A13; Xun-Zi, “Wang-Zhi,” “Jun-
Dao,” “Qiang-Guo”). As Xun Zi’s metaphor tellingly illustrates, the ruler is to the 
people as the headwater is to the river. Also, as William De Barry remarks, min 
recurrent in classic texts which I discussed above often appear in conjunction with, and 
recognition of, rulership (jun 君) and ideal personhood (jun-zi 君子) (De Bary 2004, 
4-7).  
   The interpretive question vis-à-vis leadership is as follows: how does leadership 
democracy preserve Confucian elitist values? The first way in which leadership 
democracy can substantiate Confucian elitist values lies in its durability and pliability 
in combining the ruler’s responsiveness to the people’s demand, with a large scope of 
flexible action required by political leadership. For one thing, as I mentioned above in 
discussing Confucian leadership styles, a Confucian ruler ought to practice the “politics 
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dislike for themselves, meaning that a ruler should refrain from imposing on the people 
the values and policies at his whim. A leadership democratic structure can guarantee, 
in institutional terms, that the ruler does not arbitrarily impinge upon the way ordinary 
people go about their daily life insofar as the democratically elected leader’s power is 
subject to the terms set by the regular mandate granted by the electorate. For another, 
the overarching concern of the Confucian masters lies in delivering on good 
governance by not only meeting the basic material needs of the people (Mencius 1A3, 
1A5, 1A7, 2A5, 3A3) but also improving and sustaining their moral caliber (Mencius 
1A3, 1A7, 3A3, 6B8, 7A14, 7A20). Some contemporary theorists have reformulated 
Confucians’ concern over the qualities of political order as Confucian perfectionist 
governance.9 In effect, the politics of inexertion, or wu-wei statecraft, already embodies 
the idea of benevolent politics, which requires the ruler set upon themselves the task of 
displaying an exemplary ethos and inspire the people towards the moral good 
(Slingerland 2007, 144-147). As the Confucian masters relentlessly avow, the quality 
and success of Confucian perfectionist governance rests on the moral disposition and 
judgement of the ruler in charge, and much less on other factors such as law, 
punishment and institutional mechanisms. In this light, leadership democracy, by 
reserving a special sense of vocation for Confucian rulers who are now recast as 
democratic leaders, can preserve much of the power traditionally wielded by the 
Confucian rulers while circumscribing the extent to which this power is misused to the 
detriment of Confucians’ plebeian concerns.  
  One of the reasons that leadership democracy can keep track of both plebeian and 
elitist values in Confucianism remarkably well lies in the way a leader emerges from 
political struggles in this model, which brings about the second aspect of its congruence 
with Confucian elitist values, namely that the leader of an elite character inevitably 
emerges from the democracy thus conceived. Indeed, an acute problem of which 
Confucian meritocrats often charge their democratic counterparts is the dilution of elite 
elements in Confucian political thought if we appeal to democratic electioneering. 
Democracy is either depicted as the idea of collective decisions directly made by the 
people or as a formal process by which political demagogues sway the electorate by 
(illegitimately) promising benefits in return for putting them in office. Neither 
depiction, however, squares with the idea of leadership democracy. 
  Among Confucian democrats, Joseph Chan10  comes closest to my account by 
identifying electoral democracy with the selection model—which he originally takes 
from Jane Mansbridge (2009)—under ideal conditions. The basic idea is that 
democratic elections can function as an efficient way in which responsible leaders are 
selected (Chan 2013, 73-79). He promptly waters down the elitist flavor of his account, 
however, by claiming that the selection model is not necessarily aristocratic but can, as 
 
9 Pertinent examples are Joseph Chan’s moderate Confucian perfectionism and Sungmoon Kim’s public 
reason Confucianism.  
10 While some commentators prefer labelling Chan as meritocratic (see Kim 2018), Chan nevertheless 
differs crucially from meritocrats such as Daniel A. Bell and Tongdong Bai in granting a decisive role 
to the democratically elected body of legislation, and further in justifying democratic institutions in 
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it should, accommodate the egalitarian idea of likeness—the idea that voters choose 
leaders who resemble them—that structures political representation in contemporary 
Western liberal democracies (Chan 2013, 79). The difficulty with his view is that he 
assumes as problematic, rather than explains away, the realistic view of the vast 
majority of the people as lacking virtues and political competence and a normative 
vision that aspires to the aristocratically oriented elite being in charge. Consequently, 
his strategy is dismissing the “old understanding” of the selection model as revolving 
around “hierarchy and distinction” (Chan 2013, 78). While Chan believes that the idea 
of likeness does not imply a mediocre representative with average abilities, he 
nevertheless favors a democratically elected leader committed to cultivating likeness, 
whatever elitist merit she possesses. As controversial is the implications of his retreat 
into the idea of likeness, which blinds us to the crucial aspect on which Confucians’ 
relentless emphasis on elitist leadership and the aristocratic feature of electoral 
democracy converge. Partly because of his lack of confidence in the elitist character of 
democratic elections, Chan readily joins Confucian meritocrats in envisioning a 
meritocratic chamber constitutive of non-electorally selected elites that stands 
independent of the democratically elected chamber.11 
   In this light, the democratic part of Chan’s theory preserves elite power but is hardly 
elitist in orientation. It is, however, no surprise that Chan is keen on severing 
democratic elections from distinctive aristocratic tendencies. Evidently, election as an 
aristocratic method of selecting leaders did not come to be associated with democracy 
until the advent of modern representative democracy after the American and French 
Revolutions. According to Manin, election manifests its elite characters in at least four 
aspects: in the unequal treatment of candidates by voters according to the measures 
widely accepted, in the necessity of the candidates having superior qualities in a certain 
social and cultural settings, in the cognitive advantages granted by visual or charismatic 
salience, and finally in the cost of information that is unequally distributed and which 
is only affordable to someone at an social and political advantage (Manin 1997, 134-
148). In effect, the elite character of election was duly recognized by the Chinese as 
early as late Qing when such figures as He Qi and Hu Liyuan advocated, in their joint 
work known as the Truthful Demonstration of New Politics (Xin-Zheng-Zhen-Quan 新
政真詮), a unitary legislative body instead of the two-House system (He, 1994). They 
believed that a House of Lords would be redundant because a lower House alone is 
capable of promoting those intelligent and virtuous who are due to be recognized by all 
as their representatives. 
  There may, however, be doubts about the affinities between Confucian and 
Weberian (or Schumpeterian) leadership qualities. Weber (1994, 220) recognizes that 
the Caesarist leader emerging out of political struggles would excel at demagoguery 
swaying the voters by rhetoric and charisma. Manin (1997, 143) also argues that leaders 
 
11 I am not against the idea of the second chamber, though. My reasoning for the second chamber, which 
serves to preserve continuity and tradition, however, differs from both republicans’ account of separation 
of powers and Confucian meritocrats’ account of elitist power. This article, however, is not the place to 
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in representative democracy are only elite in appearance—instead of being truly noble, 
they are only perceived by the public as possessing elite characters in certain social and 
cultural settings. Admittedly, there are largely two aspects in which Confucian and 
Caesarist leaders may part company. First, in leadership democracy, the stakes are high 
in political struggles by which politicians engage in a complex process of persuasions 
and negotiations. For Weber, in order for a leader not to be purely demagogic, it is 
essential that she go through power struggles in partisan and parliamentary politics. In 
contrast, the direct flow from ethical self-cultivation to one’s outer sphere of life in 
Confucianism means that a Confucian elite does not need to excel at political gimmicks 
in order to be able to lead. Instead, political and personal virtues are united in self-
cultivation oriented towards moral goodness whether one is in office or not. When 
asked why not participate in politics, Confucius replied that “the Book of History says, 
‘Oh! Simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert an 
influence upon government.’ In so doing, a man is, in fact, taking part in government. 
How can there be any question of his having actively to take part in government” 
(Analects 2.21)?  
  What follows from the first aspect is a divergence in the virtues or capabilities 
needed for a successful leader, which is the second aspect in which leadership 
democracy prima facie defies Confucian leadership. For Weber (1994, 352), the 
desirable qualities required of the leader, are a sense of passion about the beliefs for 
which one fights, a sense of responsibility by which one weighs the consequences for 
political action, and capabilities for shrewd judgement in changing circumstances. 
Underlying these desiderata is an acute awareness of the danger and frailty built into 
power relations in politics. For the Confucians, the cardinal virtues required in politics 
are of an overwhelmingly humanitarian nature, which include, among others, the 
virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. In other words, a 
Confucian leader needs to be vigilant to human sufferings and roll out benevolent 
policies to address them. Bell (2016, 60-61), for instance, picks up on the divergence 
here by holding democracy of one-person-one-vote responsible for the disruption of 
harmonious relationships constitutive of Confucian ethics. To borrow the market 
analogy, the Confucian leader not only plays along as suppliers interested in gathering 
votes but also directly attends to the fundamental wants and needs of ordinary people, 
which is markedly different from power-hunting politicians.                                         
  In response, we may say, first, that the fact that the idea of CLD piggybacks on 
leadership democracy does not mean that CLD needs to accept all features of its 
prototype. Some aspects of leadership democracy, in its original form, indeed sit ill 
with CLD. For instance, I do not deny Weber’s obsession with charisma and demagogy 
which defies some Confucian leadership qualities; nor do I dismiss his understanding 
of modern political parties as bureaucratically organized apparatus which requires 
charismatic leadership to rein it in. Far from absorbing all theoretical premises of 
Weber and Schumpeter, CLD attempts instead to remedy the aspects of its protype that 
it finds problematic while keeping its conceptual intelligibility. Second, the gap 
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appears. Rather, leadership democracy can help weather problems inherent in 
traditional Confucian politics thereby restoring the spirit of Confucian elitism. 
  In terms of the extent to which leadership democracy conduces to Confucian elite 
qualities, three aspects are particularly worth highlighting. First, despite their different 
understandings of politics and merits required of political leaders, both leadership 
democrats and Confucians would regard resilience and elasticity, astute judgment as 
well as a commitment to serving public office, as particularly relevant to political 
leadership. Second, leadership democrats’ attendance to power and the way it operates 
between elite and people demonstrate not so much their cynicism about moral concerns 
but their perspicacity in directly confronting and containing the dark side of politics. 
Weber (1994, 369), who champions Caesarist democracy, emphasizes the importance 
of combining passion with a willingness to cope with the consequences of one’s action, 
the balance of which defines genuine vocational statesmanship. Third, as I noted in the 
section on plebeian values, one distinctive feature of Confucian wu-wei politics is the 
tremendous care that the ruler takes to cater to what the people actually want for 
themselves. In this light, that the democratic system is so designed as to give incentives 
for the elite to compete for popular votes does not prevent them cultivating broader 
senses of statesmanship. Far from undermining the nourishment of virtues, we can say 
that being attentive to popular demands and finding intelligent ways to address them is 
an integral part of Confucian wu-wei politics.12  
  The reason that the Confucian spirit supports and justifies leadership democracy 
can be further gleaned from the uneasy relationship between Confucian intellectuals 
and the traditional monarchy that have long troubled Confucianism throughout East 
Asian political history (De Bary 1996, 46-56). Traditionally, Confucian leadership was 
comprised of enlightened rulership and ministership that was put up to rectify the 
former’s drawbacks. When I mentioned Confucian leadership, I meant both, but far 
from complementary, they were in constant tension. According to De Bary, what 
bedeviled Confucians’ effort to bring about the benevolent Way is that Confucianism 
put upon the nobleman or scholar-officials (shi-da-fu 士大夫 ) all burdens of 
responsibility without giving valency to social forms and institutions. When despotism 
arises and wreaks havoc on the society, Confucians readily take the blame because they 
are supposed to break through the cant and the convention to give effect to the Way. 
Accordingly, one of the strains that tends to pull apart Confucian moral integrity is the 
issue of participation in politics (Eno 1990, 42-51). On the one hand, the proto-
participatory aspect of the Confucians can be found in the frequency with which moral 
principles are discussed in relation to governance. On the other hand, rulers were 
predominantly corrupt and egocentric and even Confucian masters struggled to find a 
ruler appreciative of their visions (Pines 2009, ch. 6 & 7). While Confucius himself 
was never for or against anything, he enjoined others to “show yourself when the Way 
 
12  Electoral competition is not sufficient for fostering Confucian wu-wei politics. Hyperbolic 
competitions in advanced democracies today acutely remind us of the need for further social ethos and 
institutional arrangements that preserve and entrench Confucian virtue cultivation among the elite. More 
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prevails in the Empire but hide yourself when it does not” (Analects 8.13). In a similar 
vein, Mencius fleshed out his view by claiming that “a Gentleman never abandons 
rightness in adversity, nor does he depart from the Way in success”, which leads him 
to conclude that “in obscurity a man makes perfect himself, but in prominence, he 
makes perfect the whole Empire as well” (Mencius 7A9). 
  The upshot of this profound ambivalence towards political involvement against the 
backdrop of dynastic rule was an incessant feud among Confucian intellectuals. Some 
Shidafu chose to stay complicit in the ruler’s brutality while aspiring to piecemeal 
reform and more audacious ones risked their life in acting on their conscience. Others 
chose to completely retreat from political affairs, which contributed to breeding a 
culture of reclusion that continued to plague Confucian orthodoxy. The rest came to 
profess a slavish devotion to supreme power, voluntarily turning the mark of the ruler. 
And let’s not forget that many sycophants of the ruler were the beneficiaries of the civil 
examination system which the meritocrats boast about (Bell 2006, 153-154; Xu 1985, 
56). One way out of this conundrum, which is at odds with the spirit of Confucianism, 
is readily proffered by leadership democracy, which, as a democratic institution, 
regulates political struggles within legitimate boundaries and keeps on board political 
opponents of all sides. A conscientious Confucian no longer needs to plunge into an 
impossible mission of reconciling their deeply cherished values with serving a ruthless 
monarch; rather, absent an autocratic ruler at the center, she can put herself forward as 
a democratic leader by directly appealing to the public. The traditional worry of 
usurpation can be dissipated by the peaceful and legitimate transfer of power. In case 
she fails to secure power, the subsequent situation is no longer a black-and-white choice 
between serving those for whom she holds contempt and withdrawal from politics, but 
a dignified role as an opposition politician in parliament or as a vocal critic of the 
government in civil society without the fear of persecution.  
   Another trouble closely related to Confucians’ political involvement is brutal 
factional strife (dang-zheng/dangjaeng 黨爭 in Chinese and Korean, also sahwa 士禍 
in Korean) recurrent in pan-Confucian societies, which can also be creatively, if not 
entirely, addressed in CLD where regularized competition placates ideational disputes 
and keeps violence at bay. Whether it is Song and Ming dynasties in China when 
Confucian doctrines held sway, or the Chosun dynasty in Korea which enshrined 
Confucianism wholesale as guiding court philosophy, factional conflicts usually went 
amuck with scholar-officials of different strands within the Confucian tradition fighting 
for political dominance (cf. Levine 2008; Lee 2007). Ideological differences easily 
escalated into full-scale power confrontations, which usually ended up with bloodshed 
and ferocious persecution. A winner often emerged not only as a victor of power 
struggles but as someone entitled to the legitimate monopoly on interpreting the true 
Way. This, however, is in stark contrast to the anti-factional attitudes held by the 
Confucian masters. Although we find in the classic texts Mencius and Xun Zi resigned 
to acrimonious exchanges with heretics over the interpretation of the Way, Confucian 
ethical teachings are, at best, averse to verbal and factional disputes. Says Confucius, 
“what the gentleman seeks, he seeks within himself; what the small man seeks, he seeks 
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contentious and comes together with other gentlemen without forming cliques” 
(Analects 15.20, 15.20). Mencius was reluctant to engage in arguments though he found 
himself compelled to argue (Mencius 3B9). While Xun Zi exhorted the nobleman to 
embrace debates, he nevertheless posited that “(a nobleman) engages in argumentation, 
but not to the point of causing a quarrel; he is critical, but not to the point of provoking 
others” (Xun-Zi, “Bu-Gou”). Xun Zi further derided the human pursuit of dominance 
(zheng 爭) as arising out of a bad penchant for satiating natural needs and wants (Xun-
Zi, “Li-Lun,” “Wang-Zhi”). Overall, Confucian ethical cultivation is motivated by a 
harmonious unity between body and world and constrained by ritual propriety, or 
simply put, the bonds of “civility” (Angle 2012, 91-110; Chan 2013, 90-91).  
   In CLD, in contrast, different vocations for Confucian beliefs can be accommodated 
with no need to obliterate one group for another to triumph, which invites three 
modifications of the traditional role played by Confucian intellectuals thereby restoring 
Confucian harmony in politics. First, Schumpeterian competition ensures that diverse 
Confucian voices can be put on an equal footing striving for the democratic mandate. 
Confucian intellectuals, recast as Confucian politicians and constrained by democratic 
mechanisms, can now bring themselves forward to competition rather than repression. 
In other words, the extent to which the electorate give effect to their confessed norms 
and values presides over, and mediates between, various Confucian groups or “parties”. 
Second, the Confucian nobleman is no longer obliged to fight a solidary battle against 
the corrupted currents of politics, which is doomed to failure and contradiction. Instead, 
they can, as protagonists in leadership democracy, form, and coordinate through, 
political parties which resemble the parties of principles as defined by Burke (1999), 
or what Weber (1994, 193) calls the parties of a particular Weltanschauung. The 
flexibility and pragmatism built into Confucian ethics would render Confucian parties 
less uncompromising than they appear, but it is crucial, for them to stay as Confucian, 
that Confucians act on their understandings of the Way rather than on a hotchpotch of 
tactics lacking disciplines. Last but not least, Confucian noblemen need, in political 
terms, seriously to take on the petty person (xiao-ren, 小人), the antipode of dignity 
and noblesse embodied in the junzi. Physical extirpation is left out of the question; 
instead, conscientious Confucians need to either win them over by persuasion or defeat 
them in elections. In short, just as archery offers a condition where “the way (noblemen) 
contend is gentlemanly” (Analects 3.7; Behuniak Jr 2010), leadership democracy 
provides a venue for Confucians to win the battle in a civil manner and even if they fail 
to win, there is institutionally protected public space where they can repose and perform 




This paper started out by a discussion of the interpretative method. I argued that 
Confucian plebeian and elitist values are embodied in a particular, elitist type of 
democracy which I call Confucian leadership democracy. I have also gone to great 
lengths to explain why it is appropriate to alter some specific texts in order to preserve 
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this way, I have gone a step further than New Confucians such as Mou Zongsan, Xu 
Fuguan and Tu Weiming in specifying what kind of democracy Confucian thought 
lends support to.  
   It should also be pointed out that not all types of leadership democracy are 
Confucian insofar as classic Confucian thought is the sufficient, though not necessary, 
condition of leadership democracy. Indeed, the family of leadership democracy can 
come with liberal, republican and Confucian variants (Posner 2005; Shapiro 2009). 
What then renders leadership democracy distinctively Confucian? In order to procure 
the Confucian attribute of leadership democracy, we also need Confucian habits and 
mores as the social ethos for citizens and the training mechanisms for leaders soaked 
in Confucian classics, rituals and norms, which are subject to a complex interplay with 
the institution of leadership democracy. Nevertheless, this article has fulfilled its 
moderate mission if the reader decides to open up to the possibility that leadership 
democracy is not antithetical to, but constitutive of, the spirit of classic Confucianism.  
   Speaking of this spirit may sometimes invite cynicism (Jenco 2017), but it is critical 
for Confucian societies in attending to the modernity issue beyond the East-West 
dichotomy. In East Asia today, especially China, there still exists a mindset of the 
antithesis between the traditional way of life which gives shape to one’s own identity, 
and the way of life imported from the West. This almost intransigent view takes hold 
regardless of what one makes of this dichotomy in normative thinking. In stark contrast, 
the first generations of Confucian scholars following the first Opium War (1839-1842) 
including Xu Jiyu and Guo Songtao extolled the virtue of Western (both British and 
American) democratic institutions as a resurrection of the Sage-King era and therefore 
the culmination of the Confucian spirit. Their pioneering efforts to understand the 
rhythm of cross-cultural connections preceded the later turn to the doctrine of “Chinese 
learning as substance, Western learning for application” embraced during the Self-
Strengthening Movement (1861-1895). This article shows that ideational connectivity 
is porous and dynamic, which may help us better understand what it really means when 
politicians and various interlocutors today speak of preserving the tradition and what 
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